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Abstract
Periods of ﬁnancial instability are associated with low bank eﬃciency and
high default rates in banks’ credit portfolios. Hence, this article intends to
analyze the relationship between non-performing loans and bank eﬃciency
in order to identify the primary instigator of bank failures. We use a Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model to estimate technical, allocative and eco-
nomic eﬃciencies. Furthermore, both a dynamic panel and a panel VAR are
applied to a recent semi-annual data ranging from june 2000 to june 2007, in-
dicating that variations on bank eﬃciency precede loan quality deterioration.
Therefore, bank eﬃciency measures may be important early warning indica-
tors of ﬁnancial instability, in particular, DEA eﬃciency measures should be
used as macroeconomic tools to evaluate the ﬁnancial system.
Key Words: bank eﬃciency, non-performing loans, causality, ﬁnancial
stability.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G15.
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31 Introduction
In the last years, ﬁnancial stability has been the center of many studies, spe-
cially after the burst of the subprime crisis in August 2007. In the current
ﬁnancial system, characterized as more liberalized, competitive and inte-
grated Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis [2009], preventing ﬁnancial
turmoils, such as bank failures, is of utmost relevance. To this end, an
important issue is to try to identify which factors promote ﬁnancial crises
in order to obtain early warning indicators as an attempt to guarantee the
soundness of the banking system. In this sense, literature has shown the
important role that bank-level fundamentals play in explaining bank failures
Gonzalez-Hermosillo [1999].
In particular, empirical works have veriﬁed that not only bank ineﬃ-
ciency contributes to the risk of failure Wheelock and Wilson [1995], Pod-
piera and Podpiera [2005], but that asset quality deteriorates rapidly before
the bankruptcy Gonzalez-Hermosillo [1999], as well. Hence, a fundamental
question is whether there exists a causality relationship between bank eﬃ-
ciency and loan quality. As Podpiera and Weill [2008] note, if one event
precedes the other, then it might be the core instigator of bank failures.
The ‘bad luck’ hypothesis Berger and DeYoung [1997] states that an in-
crease in non-performing loans is caused by an unexpected exogenous event
(bad luck), such as economic slowdowns or ﬁrms’ breakdown. Banks will,
consequently, incur higher costs in order to monitor these problem loans, de-
creasing eﬃciency. The extra expenses include diverse factors, among which:
the extra costs of dealing with delinquent borrowers, the occasional reduc-
tion in the respective collateral value and the price of renegotiating debts.
Thus, under this hypothesis, soaring problem loans lead to low levels of bank
eﬃciency, i.e., there is a negative relationship between the two variables.
On the other hand, the ‘bad management’ hypothesis Berger and DeY-
oung [1997] considers that the low eﬃciency is related to subpar management,
which is also reﬂected on a poor credit monitoring, aﬀecting loan quality and
resulting in high default (endogenous, in this case). Once again, bank eﬃ-
ciency and non-performing loans are negatively related, though in a diﬀerent
temporal ordering.
Two alternative hypotheses, by contrast, state a positive inter-temporal
relationship from bank eﬃciency to credit risk. Firstly, under the ‘skimp-
ing’ hypothesis Berger and DeYoung [1997], ﬁrms maximizing proﬁts in the
long run may appear more eﬃcient in the short run, when reducing costs by
devoting less resources to monitoring and underwriting loans. Nonetheless,
the ﬁnancial institution will consequently have to cope with delinquent bor-
rowers and the respective costs of dealing with these clients in the future.
4Conversely, the ‘risk-averse management’ hypothesis Koutsomanoli-Filippaki
and Mamatzakis [2009] assumes bank managers to be risk-averse, so that
they could increase operational expenses allocated to loan monitoring and
screening, reducing bank eﬃciency, with the purpose of compressing default
in credit portfolios. The fear of facing ﬁnancial crises and information asym-
metry are possible explanations for the positive relationship between bank
eﬃciency and problem loans, in this case4.
Surprisingly, there seems to be only a limited number of studies test-
ing if non-performing loans are caused by exogenous or endogenous events,
what results in an inconclusive relationship between the credit risk variable
and bank eﬃciency. The seminal work on this subject, Berger and DeYoung
[1997], shows that for the industry of North American commercial banks as
a whole, there is a negative relationship between problem loans and cost ef-
ﬁciency in both directions for the period from 1985 to 1994, although the
data favor the ‘skimping’ hypothesis for a subset of banks persistently ef-
ﬁcient across time. Accordingly, Rossi et al. [2009] also provide evidences
for both the ‘bad luck’ and the ‘bad management’ hypotheses in the case
of large Austrian commercial banks between 1997 and 2003. By contrast,
Williams [2004], with a sample of European savings banks over the years
1990-1998, supports the ‘bad management’ hypothesis, indicating that low
levels of cost eﬃciency deteriorate loan quality, consequently augmenting
the probability of bank failure, in line with Fiordelisi et al. [2010] that use
a data set of European commercial banks with respect to the period 1995-
2007. Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis [2009], alternatively, support
the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis when analyzing 27 European Union members from
1998 to 2006. However, the ‘bad management’ hypothesis is not rejected, spe-
cially in the case of low ﬁnancial development countries, albeit it performs a
lower impact.
Nonetheless, there is still a poor focus on emerging countries. Firstly,
Rossi et al. [2005] investigate nine European transition countries during the
period 1995-2002 noting an exogenous origin for credit risk, consistent with
the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis. Subsequently, Podpiera and Weill [2008] conclude
that the main cause of bank failures in the Czech Republic between 1994 and
2005 is bad management.
In emerging countries, ﬁnancial crises become particularly important as
far as they reduce economic growth given that a great portion of the invest-
ments relies on banks’ credit oﬀer. Brazil is a meaningful case, since besides
constituting one of the largest banking systems in Latin America, it also rep-
resents a complex ﬁnancial market with roughly one third of banking assets
4A more detailed description of the hypotheses can be found in the related literature.
5of private banks, one third of state-owned and one third of foreign participa-
tion. Hence, the evidences to be presented here are of multiple nationality
and multiple bank type interest.
Our main contribution points in the direction of identifying relevant fac-
tors that may anticipate a systemic instability, in order to help bank regu-
lators and supervisors to assure a healthy ﬁnancial system. For this matter,
by indicating that increases/decreases in bank eﬃciency precede variations
on non-performing loans, our results provide evidence that DEA eﬃciency
measures may be helpful in assessing potential future risks in the banking
system. Therefore, they may be included in the regulator’s toolkit to evaluate
ﬁnancial stability.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the methodology employed. Section 3 presents the data. The empirical




The NPL ratio is directly available from the data, but as cost functions
are not straightly observable, eﬃciency must be estimated. To estimate
eﬃciency, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, in ac-
cordance to Staub et al. [2010]. We estimate three types of bank eﬃciency.
Technical eﬃciency is associated with the eﬃcient use of inputs within the
bank technology, evaluating the amount of input used to produce certain
output. On the other hand, allocative eﬃciency is related to how the mix of
inputs aﬀects the production process, since changes in the mix of inputs used
can increase/decrease output. Overall eﬃciency is measured by economic ef-
ﬁciency.
Two important advantages of the non-parametric DEA methodology jus-
tify its use here. Firstly, the DEA demands very few assumptions about the
technological production function, avoiding arbitrary suppositions about the
eﬃcient frontier shape. Moreover, the DEA is a widely employed technique
and easy to work with complex relations between multiple outputs. In this
sense, as Banker and Natarajan [2004] point out, technical, allocative and
economic eﬃciencies can be computed through the use of total expenditures
data only, without direct knowledge of particular input prices.
In studies of contextual variables5, the DEA relies on statistical proce-
5Factors likely to aﬀect eﬃciency.
6dures of two stages. On the ﬁrst stage, the eﬃciencies are estimated. On
the second, the regression is modeled with eﬃciency as the dependent vari-
able and contextual variables as independent. Technical problems may arise
from this procedure due to possible correlation among eﬃciency measures.
However, if the contextual variables are exogenous to the production process,
Simar and Wilson [2007], Souza and Staub [2007], and Banker and Natarajan
[2008] indicate that the two stage analysis is viable and, under certain error
circumstances, can even capture stochastic and non-parametric eﬃciency re-
sults6. Motivated by these recent ﬁndings in DEA, we consider an extension
for panel data in this work.
Consider a production process with n production units (banks). Each
unit employs varying quantities of p distinct inputs x to produce varying
quantities of s distinct products y.D e n o t eb yY =( y1,...,y n) the production
matrix s x n of the n banks and by X =( x1,...,x n) the input matrix p x n.
The element yr ≥ 0 is the production vector s x 1o fb a n kr and xr is the
input vector p x 1u s e db yb a n kr to produce yr (the condition l ≥ 0m e a n s
that at least one l component is strictly positive). The matrices Y =( yir)
and X =( xir)m u s ts a t i s f y :

i lir > 0a n d

r lir > 0, where l is x or y.
In our application, p =3a n ds = 3. Furthermore, it will be necessary that
xr,y r > 0 (which means that all components of the input and the output
vectors are strictly positive).
In line with Banker and Natarajan [2004], we deal with technical, alloca-
tive and economic eﬃciencies employing aggregate cost variables. In this
context, C =( c1,...,c n) is the total cost vector, where cr is the total pro-
duction cost of bank r and V =( v1,...,v n) is the input cost matrix. Here,
vir is the expenditure of bank r with the input i (the ith component of vector
vr). The knowledge of a vector of input prices g =( g1,...,g p)r e s u l t si n
vir = gixir and cr =
p
i=1 vir.
The procedure can be formulated as a linear programming. Thus, eco-
nomic eﬃciency is computed as
θ
e
r =a r g m i n{θ; Yλ≥ yr,C λ≤ θcr,λ 1=1 ,λ≥ 0}.
Technical eﬃciency is calculated as
θ
tec
r =a r g m i n{θ; Yλ≥ yr,Vλ≤ θvr,λ 1=1 ,λ≥ 0}.
6See Banker and Natarajan [2008].








where θ is the measured bank eﬃciency and λ represents a vector of
constants that form linear combinations of all inputs and outputs of the
observed banks. The eﬃciency measures are computed for each bank for
each of the T years to generate a panel of observations (θe
it,θ tec
it ,θ a
it)w i t h
t =1 ,...,T and i =1 ,...,n. The restriction, λ1=1 ,r e s u l t si nam o d e l
with Variable Returns to Scale , i.e., for a given output level, minimizing the
amount of input used still produce the output level predetermined.
We adopt statistical models to evaluate the signiﬁcance of covariables
(factors) in the eﬃciency measures, assuming independence between factors
and errors. The models we use adjust to the category of dynamic panel data
analysis and consider the serial correlation in the bank population. Cross-
correlations among banks during the periods induced by DEA calculations
seem to be despicable and, pursuant to Souza and Staub [2007] and Banker
and Natarajan [2008], are not patterned.
2.2 Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel
The presence of the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory vari-
ables characterizes a dynamic model. Therefore, since more eﬃcient banks
in a speciﬁc year are inclined to remain eﬃcient in the following year, we
consider a dynamic model in the DEA response.
Our dynamic panel of Arellano and Bond [1991] considers
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + βxi,t−1 + ui,t i =1 ,...,N t=1 ,...,T i (1)
where α and β are the parameters to be estimated, y is EFF, the eﬃciency
measured by DEA and x represents NPL, the ratio of non-performing loans
divided by total loans7. We consider as non-performing loans the ones that
are 90 days past due or more. We also estimate the model with yi,t = NPL
in order to reproduce the panel VAR methodology and test the robustness
of our results, as well as, to identify the optimal lag order for the panel VAR
approach.
Since the variables NPL and EFF are strongly aﬀected by transitory
conditions Berger and DeYoung [1997], one must control for these factors.
We eliminate the aggregate bank-speciﬁc macro shocks by subtracting the
7We regress all our variables in ln. This applies to both the Arellano-Bond dynamic
panel and the panel VAR.
8respective mean of each variable calculated for each bank type-year. For this
reason, we do not include time dummies in our Arellano-Bond dynamic panel
estimation.
The error term is ui,t = vi +  i,t,w i t h i,t representing the idiosyncratic
disturbances. The bank-speciﬁc eﬀects, vi are assumed to be stochastic and
not-correlated with  i,t. Furthermore, we consider both the bank eﬃciency
(EFF) and the rate of non-performing loans (NPL) as endogenous variables,
i.e., correlated with the non-observed error term  i,t.
To eliminate the unobserved individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the model takes ﬁrst
diﬀerences of equation (1):
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)+β(xi,t−1 − xi,t−2)+(  i,t −  i,t−1)( 2 )
In this work, we employ the System-GMM8 and following Roodman [2006]
we report all our speciﬁcation choices. To begin with, the Arellano-Bond and
Blundell-Bond estimators have one- and two-step variants. The two-step is
asymptotically more eﬃcient; however the reported two-step standard errors
tend to be severely downward biased Arellano and Bond [1991], Blundell
and Bond [1998]. Therefore, we use a ﬁnite-sample correction to the two-
step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer [2005], which makes two-step
robust estimations more eﬃcient than one-step robust, especially for System-
GMM.
An additional problem is that when instruments are many, they tend
to overﬁt the instrumented variables and bias the results toward those of
OLS/GLS. Hence, we reduce the width of the instrument matrix and employ
fewer instruments than the number of groups (99 banks). The constant is
not included in our dynamic panel speciﬁcation to keep consistency with the
VAR model replication Love and Zicchino [2006], which does not consider the
constant term in its estimation since the ﬁxed eﬀects and the macro shocks
are eliminated.
As a method based on instrumental variables, the GMM relies on the va-
lidity of the moment conditions. For this purpose, we test for over-identifying
8The System-GMM Arellano and Bover [1995], Blundell and Bond [1998] is an extension
of the Diﬀerence-GMM Arellano and Bond [1991] estimator. Mainly, the former makes
an additional assumption that ﬁrst diﬀerences of instrumenting variables are uncorrelated
with the ﬁxed eﬀects. In contrast with the Arellano and Bond [1991] estimator - which
uses only lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments for equation (2), the
System-GMM estimator consists of two equations - the original equation, or the level
equation (1), which employs lagged diﬀerences as instruments; and the transformed or
in-diﬀerence equation (2), which, as stated above, adopts lagged levels of the variables
as instruments. Thus, the Arellano-Bond is extended, improving its eﬃciency Roodman
[2006].
9restrictions using the Hansen statistic9. The null hypothesis is that the in-
struments are valid, that is, not correlated with the error term and that the
excluded instruments were correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
Moreover, it is important to notice that the test has low power if the model
includes a very large set of excluded instruments. Therefore, we also investi-
gate the Diﬀerence-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets10.
In addition to the test of joint validity of instruments, we test for auto-
correlation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term  it employing the Arellano
and Bond autocorrelation test under the null of zero serial correlation in
order to verify if there are lags which are invalid instruments. Since nega-
tive ﬁrst-order serial correlation is expected in diﬀerences due to the relation
between Δ it and Δ i,t−1 via the term  i,t−1,w ea c t u a l l yl o o kf o rr-order se-
rial correlation with r =2 ,...,T. While the test is applied to the residuals
in diﬀerences, ﬁrst-order serial correlation in levels would be indicated by
second-order correlation in diﬀerences (AR(2) test). In this case, the yi,t−2
variable, for example, would be endogenous to the  i,t−1 term in the error
component in diﬀerences ( i,t −  i,t−1), what would make it an invalid in-
strument. Thus, it should be required to instrument with deeper lags. We
therefore employ the Arellano-Bond test to determine the optimal lag order
to be later used in the panel VAR model.
2.3 VAR Model
To appraise the relationship between bank eﬃciency and non-performing
loans, we also adopt the traditional VAR approach, which considers the sys-
tem variables as endogenous, combined with the panel data analysis Love
and Zicchino [2006]. Herewith, it is permitted individual non-observed het-
erogeneity as follows:
zi,t =Γ 0 +Γ 1zi,t−1 + fi + db,t + et (3)
where zi,t is a vector of two variables {NPL,EFF}.Γ 0 and Γ1 are pa-
rameters to be estimated and fi are ﬁxed eﬀects that allow for individual
heterogeneity. db,t is a dummy that captures internal macroeconomic shocks
which aﬀect all banks. This dummy was eliminated when we subtracted the
respective average of each variable calculated for each bank type-year.
9The Sargan statistic is a special case of Hansen’s J under the assumption of ho-
moscedasticity.
10The test is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the Hansen statistic with a lower number
of instruments, excluding the subset of possible invalid instruments, and the equation with
all instruments, including those of suspicious validity. The null hypothesis is that both
the reduced number of instruments and the additional suspicious instruments are valid.
10The model is estimated through GMM and calculated after the ﬁxed
eﬀects have been removed by the use of the forward mean-diﬀerencing, or
so called ‘Helmert’ transformation11. Once the VAR variables are obtained,
impulse response functions are engendered with their respective conﬁdence
intervals at a signiﬁcance level of 5% being estimated by applying Monte
Carlo simulation. The analysis of these functions makes it possible to draw
conclusions about the response of each eﬃciency to the rate of non-performing
loans and vice-versa, since they show the response of a speciﬁc variable to a
one standard error shock in another variable in the system, keeping all other
disturbances equal to zero.
However, to isolate shocks it is required to decompose the residuals so
that they are orthogonal. A common way to deal with this problem is to
choose a speciﬁc ordering with earlier variables being more exogenous and
later ones more endogenous. To ﬁt this purpose, we assume bank eﬃciency to
be relatively more exogenous than non-performing loans. We believe this is
a plausible assumption given that our data favor the hypotheses in line with
the idea of bank eﬃciency preceding variations in the rate of problem loans.
Therefore, non-performing loans is considered an endogenous risk variable.
To complete the interpretation of our ﬁndings, we also expose the matrix
with variance decompositions, which describe the percent of one variable
explained by innovations accumulated over time in another variable.
We expect the bank eﬃciency response to a shock in NPL to be negative,
once an increase in the rate of problem loans should generate low eﬃciency
levels as the bank could not be able to retrace completely to the borrowers
all the costs proceeding from the increase in default (‘bad luck’ hypothesis).
On the other hand, the rate of non-performing loans can either react
positively or negatively to a variation in bank eﬃciency. In the ﬁrst case,
there are two diﬀerent views: a reduction in bank eﬃciency caused by higher
expenses with loan monitoring should, similarly, result in less problem loans
(‘risk-averse management’ hypothesis); or, by contrast, an increase in bank
eﬃciency triggered by less expenses with loan monitoring may boost default
in the future (‘skimping’ hypothesis). In the second case, however, a less eﬃ-
cient management can magnify the rate of default since ineﬃciency might be
veriﬁed not only in high operational expenses, but also in failure to monitor
and appropriately control credit portfolios (‘bad management’ hypothesis).
11See Love and Zicchino [2006] for a more detailed discussion.
113 Data Sampling
We use a semi-annual data set from COSIF (National Plan of Banking Ac-
counts)12, with respect to the period from june 2000 to june 2007. We elim-
inate from our sample all banks which included less than 3 observations. In
particular, this procedure led to a total of 99 banks, resulting in a panel of
1316 observations. However, there are 1217 observations when we include 1
semi-annual lag in the model.
Place Table 1 About Here
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in our
models. Overall, there seems to be a great variation across banks as veriﬁed
by the minimum and maximum of all variables. This fact illustrates that
our banks are considerably heterogeneous. NPL ranges from 0% to approxi-
mately 46%, whereas the values for the bank eﬃciencies are located between
the following intervals: technical eﬃciency ranges from 0.019 to 1, allocative
eﬃciency from 0.033 to 2.652 and economic eﬃciency from 0.002 to 1. The
mean of our bank eﬃciencies is in line with previous ﬁndings Staub et al.
[2010], showing that Brazilian banks operate far from the eﬃcient frontier if
compared to other countries.
For the calculus of the DEA eﬃciency measures, we must deﬁne inputs
and outputs. In this sense, we follow the intermediation approach13. Here,
banks can be seen as intermediators between investors and savers. In other
words, it collects deposits to convert them into loans by the use of capital
(operational expenses net of personnel expenses)14 and labor (personnel ex-
penses) as inputs. Moreover, borrowed funds and interest expenses generated
by the institutions are also considered as inputs.
As noted by Berger and Humphrey [1991], deposits can be included as
outputs once they are assumed to be proportional to the service outputs
oﬀered to depositors. Besides, loans and investments are important outputs
in the Brazilian case as they constitute about two thirds of banking assets.
Under the DEA methodology, one compares the product creation of each
individual bank with similar production units. Higher interest expenses im-
ply greater relative usage of borrowed funds. Thus, an eﬃcient bank is capa-
ble of using less inputs, such as interest, operational and personnel expenses,
and produce more output, such as deposits, loans and investments.
12Account report that all ﬁnancial institutions must state to the Central Bank of Brazil
on monthly basis.
13The great majority of the DEA studies adopt an intermediation approach Sathye
[2003].
14Proxy for capital expenses.
124 Empirical Results
When adjusting the data for the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel (Table 2), the
Hansen test suggests that the models are correctly speciﬁed, considering that
there are no evidences of correlation between instruments and errors. The
Diﬀerence-in-Hansen tests do not reject the null of exogeneity of a subset
of instruments, reinforcing the absence of correlation between errors and
instruments.
Place Table 2 About Here
Regarding the tests for autocorrelation in the residuals in diﬀerences, the
AR(1) test rejects the null hypothesis of no existence of ﬁrst-order serial
autocorrelation to the bank eﬃciencies and NPL equations, as expected, in-
dicating a negative ﬁrst-order serial autocorrelation. Contrarily, the AR(2)
test does not detect evidences of second-order serial correlation in all equa-
tions, implying that all instruments are valid. We opt for a speciﬁcation with
a lower number of instruments following Roodman [2006]. We test several
speciﬁcations and choose the most parsimonious one.
The estimated Arellano-Bond coeﬃcients show that the positive NPL re-
sponse to a variation on technical eﬃciency is expressive and signiﬁcant at
a 1% level, suggesting that the causality would run from bank eﬃciency to
non-performing loans. Furthermore, as the coeﬃcients of the allocative and
economic eﬃciencies on the NPL equation are not signiﬁcant, the most plau-
sible hypotheses seem to be the ‘skimping’ and the ‘risk-averse management’
from the positive technical eﬃciency coeﬃcient. Accordingly, when technical,
allocative and economic eﬃciencies are the dependent variables, the supposi-
tion of bank eﬃciency preceding changes in credit default and not otherwise
is conﬁrmed, for there is a close to zero and statistically not signiﬁcant eﬀect
of problem loans on all three types of bank eﬃciency.
Place Table 3 About Here
Looking at the VAR results, Table 3 indicates that the impact of NPL on
technical eﬃciency is close to zero and not signiﬁcant. On the other hand,
the eﬀect of technical eﬃciency on problem loans is found to be positive
and signiﬁcant at a 5% level, once more indicating that the causality would
run from bank eﬃciency to non-performing loans. Turning to the allocative
eﬃciency case, it performs a poor and not signiﬁcant response to a variation
in NPL, whereas non-performing loans react negatively to changes in this
bank eﬃciency, with a signiﬁcance level of 10%. Consequently, the panel VAR
statistical inference is considerably similar to the Arellano-Bond dynamic
13panel outcomes, supporting the idea of bank eﬃciency explaining variations
in the rate of non-performing loans in credit portfolios. Finally, looking at
the economic eﬃciency, it appears to have a negative impact on problem
loans and to be despicably aﬀected by the credit risk variable. Nonetheless,
none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
To a full comprehension of the ﬁndings, however, one must analyze the
impulse response functions generated along with the variance decomposition
matrix. Figures 1 to 3 display the graphics of the orthogonalized impulse
response functions for the VAR model. It is important to note that the
impulse response functions reﬂect the same relationships estimated by the
VAR parameters.
Place Figure 1 About Here
Place Figure 2 About Here
Place Figure 3 About Here
To begin with, the ﬁrst row of the technical eﬃciency outcomes in Figure
1 conﬁrms our previous results considering that there seems to be a close to
zero eﬀect of NPL on technical eﬃciency both in the estimated coeﬃcients
and in the impulse response functions. Moreover, the conﬁdence interval is
wide in the pick response, which is low in magnitude. The evidence for a
reverse causation appears to be much stronger as the response of NPL to a
one standard deviation shock in technical eﬃciency is negative and large in
magnitude with a low conﬁdence interval in the short run, whereas it becomes
positive before the ﬁrst semester and converges to the equilibrium in the long
run. Hence, we might expect bank eﬃciency to be the origin of higher rates
of non-performing loans.
The allocative eﬃciency outcomes are presented in Figure 2. It can be
seen from the ﬁrst row that a shock to NPL has little impact on bank eﬃ-
ciency. The pick response of the allocative eﬃciency to innovations of NPL
occurs in the ﬁrst semester with a large conﬁdence interval, while it converges
to zero thereafter. On the other hand, the reaction of the allocative eﬃciency
to a one-standard deviation shock in non-performing loans is initially positive
and large in magnitude, with a smaller conﬁdence interval, becoming negative
and converting to the equilibrium afterwards. Therefore, since the reaction
of NPL to a variation in the allocative eﬃciency is much more expressive,
the idea of bank eﬃciency preceding problem loans is reinforced.
14In addition, turning to the economic eﬃciency in Figure 3, we ﬁnd little
evidence of a causality in either direction as there are small responses and
large conﬁdence intervals for shocks in the studied variables15.
We view our results as supportive of an idea where it is of great rel-
evance to analyze bank eﬃciency as the macroprudential indicator (NPL)
appears to be mainly originated endogenously. By the technical eﬃciency
outcomes, higher default rates seem to be originated in internal problems,
consistent with the ‘bad management’ hypothesis. In other words, supbar
managers may not only incur high expenses, but poorly monitor loans, as
well, ultimately leading to a greater rate of problem loans. The positive rela-
tionship afterwards indicates a risk-averse management, i.e., when verifying
an increase in the credit risk variable, managers tend to, consequently, incur
additional costs so as to monitor loan quality and control the rise in problem
loans. Hereupon, the response of NPL to a shock in bank eﬃciency con-
verges to the equilibrium. Thus, managers might not only spend excessively,
but also ineﬃciently monitor loans, therefore, generating a high default rate,
according to the ‘bad management’ hypothesis Berger and DeYoung [1997].
The uncertainty brought up by the increase in non-performing loans can sig-
nal the beginning of a period of ﬁnancial instability, leading (risk-averse)
managers to allocate more resources to loan monitoring, worsening bank ef-
ﬁciency, but restraining, by contrast, the rate of problem loans, along with
the ‘risk-averse management’ hypothesis.
Although less signiﬁcant16, the allocative eﬃciency presents an alterna-
tive interpretation. When maximizing proﬁts, ﬁrms may reduce their fund
destined to loan monitoring and control, in order to create the appearance
of eﬃciency in the short run, since less resources can initially support a con-
stant amount of loans. Nonetheless, when the rate of default goes high in the
long-run, bank ineﬃciency emerges, showing that the covered ineﬃciency is
the primary cause of non-performing loans. Hence, as an eﬀort to overcome
its ineﬃciency, banks might try to increase bank eﬃciency, but bear the con-
sequences of rising problem loans later on. By not being able to maintain
this strategy, it becomes most likely to verify that the subpar management
is the primary explanation for an increase in default, in line with our main
15It is important to note that we reject the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis, according to which
non-performing loans would be caused by the exogenous component ‘bad luck’, given that
the eﬀect of NPL on bank eﬃciency is considerably close to zero and not signiﬁcant on all
the estimated models.
16From the results, we expect technical eﬃciency to be the main cause of ineﬃciency
triggering high default rates in Brazil.
15conclusion17.
The variance decomposition will enrich our discussion. It exhibits the
percent of variation in the row variable explained by the column variable.
The total eﬀect accumulated over time is in line with our prior evidences,
favoring the hypothesis of bank eﬃciency explaining NPL’s innovation for
the technical and allocative cases18. Mainly, bank eﬃciency seems to explain
more of the variations in non-performing loans, than otherwise, showing that
the ‘bad management’, ‘risk-averse’ and ‘skimping’ hypotheses are the most
likely assumptions in this paper.
Place Tabel 4 About Here
5 Final Considerations
We use the Granger-causality tests to identify the intertemporal relation-
ship between non-performing loans and bank eﬃciency for Brazilian banks
over the years 2000-2007. With all the caveat concerning our investigation19,
the Arellano-Bond dynamic model and the panel-VAR yield, in general,20
a statistical signiﬁcant relationship ranging from bank eﬃciency to non-
performing loans. I appears, overall, that ineﬃciency is the primary trigger
of soaring problem loans. Hence, it is fundamental to study bank eﬃciency
since it precedes a macroprudential indicator: non-performing loans. In other
words, bank eﬃciency measures are important for the banking system reg-
ulation for providing informational content. Thus, we suggest that bank
eﬃciency measures, in particular DEA eﬃciency measures, should be used
as an early warning indicator of ﬁnancial stability.
Our empirical observation embodies other important policy implications
as a matter of reducing the probability of bank failures. At ﬁrst, the princi-
pals for assuring a healthy banking system, such as, supervisors, regulators,
owners and managers, should bare in mind that the main risks faced by bank-
ing institutions are most likely originated in internal errors, principally, in
subpar management Berger and DeYoung [1997]. Thereby, the improvement
of bank eﬃciency must be the focus of regulatory polices in order to restrain
17Although we have evidence for a positive association between bank eﬃciency and
NPL (‘skimping’ and risk-averse management’ hypotheses), it seems, however, that ‘bad
management’ is the primary and initial instigator of problem loans.
18We view the percent variation of the economic eﬃciency explained by NPL and vice-
versa as considerably similar.
19We acknowledge that the causality in question follows the Granger-causalitytechnique,
i.e., is in line with inter-temporal precedence.
20The results are robust for both models.
16credit risk. Rossi et al. [2009] recall the relevance of the Basel II regulatory
framework, which emphasizes a supervisory review process as an important
step for a more risk-sensitive system. At this rate, a diminishing proba-
bility of bank failures would be conditioned to better managerial practices,
what demands incentives to improve human capital in order to ameliorate
performance.
We conclude that there are strong evidences that a low cost eﬃciency
may result in greater vulnerability, given that such bad performance should
be related to an increase in the system credit risk. This would also demand
special eﬀort of banking supervisors to reduce the exposure to risk practices
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis [2009]. Another suggested aspect
to improve stability is linked to a more rigorous ﬁnancial regulation as a
matter of constricting risk, in particular, systemic risk. The aforementioned
regulation is in vigor in Brazil and explains, partially, why the recent ﬁnancial
crisis had little eﬀect on our domestic banking system. Lastly, one should also
emphasize the importance of transparency, like the disclosure of oﬀ balance
sheet items and of risky management activities in order to improve banking
stability and reduce the incidence of crises Nier [2005], Breuer [2006].
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19Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables in the Arellano-Bond and the
VAR Model.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NPL 0.0201708 0.0336288 0 0.4581309
Technical 0.6558859 0.2522241 0.0191443 1
Allocative 0.6935725 0.2393757 0.0335856 2.652515
Economic 0.4727922 0.2606144 0.0019998 1
Statistics are for N = 1316.
20Table 2: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel to NPL and technical, allocative and
economic eﬃciencies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







NPLt−1 0.00246 0.384*** 0.00338 0.631*** -0.00555 0.713***
(0.00887) (0.0837) (0.00670) (0.137) (0.00847) (0.153)
Number of observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217
Number of banks 99 99 99 99 99 99
N u m b e r o f i n s t r u m e n t s 1 02 82 84 81 02 6
F Test 20.46*** 29.09*** 14.42*** 10.81*** 43.15*** 13.81***
AR(1) -5.074*** -3.794*** -3.681*** -3.579*** -4.447*** -3.715***
AR(2) 0.145 1.098 1.468 1.260 1.403 1.295
Hansen Test 8.962 28.14 29.31 56.47 8.037 29.33
Hansen Test Excluding Group 8.28 27.07 25.50 26.70 6.02 28.18
Diﬀerence-in-Hansen 0.68 1.07 3.80 29.77 2.02 1.15
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
21Table 3: VAR model to NPL and technical, allocative and economic eﬃcien-
cies.







NPL(t−1) 0.0051 0.4676*** 0.0055 0.4874*** 0.0099 0.4691***
(0.008) (0.062) (0.007) (0.061) (0.009) (0.062)
Coeﬃcients of VAR regression to non-performing loans and technical,
allocative and economic eﬃciencies. The symbols ***,**,* represent
statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses.
22Table 4: Variance decompositions for NPL and bank eﬃciency.
s Technical NPL Allocative NPL Economic NPL
Technical 10 .99756452 .00243548 Allocative .99685667 .00314333 Economic .99313895 .00686105
NPL 10 .02632684 .97367316 NPL .03934097 .96065903 NPL .00098696 .99901304
Technical 20 .99756446 .00243554 Allocative .99685655 .00314345 Economic .99313814 .00686186
NPL 20 .0263275 .9736725 NPL .03934275 .96065725 NPL .00098697 .99901303
Percent of variation in the row variable explained by column variable.
23Figure 1: Technical Eﬃciency - NPL
Impulse−responses for 1 lag VAR of ln_Technical ln_NPL
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte−Carlo with 1000 reps
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24Figure 2: Allocative Eﬃciency - NPL
Impulse−responses for 1 lag VAR of ln_Allocative ln_NPL
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte−Carlo with 1000 reps
response of ln_Allocative to ln_Allocative shock
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25Figure 3: Economic Eﬃciency - NPL
Impulse−responses for 1 lag VAR of ln_Economic ln_NPL
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte−Carlo with 1000 reps
response of ln_Economic to ln_Economic shock
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